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Defending Worldwide Taxation With A ShareholderBased Definition Of Corporate Residence*
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,** Robert J. Peroni*** & Stephen E. Shay****
This Article argues that a principled, efficient, and practical
definition of corporate residence is necessary even if some form of
corporate integration is adopted, and that such a definition is a key
element in designing either a real worldwide or a territorial income tax
system as well as a potential restraint on the inversion phenomenon. The
Article proposes that the United States adopt a shareholder-based
definition of corporate residence that is structured as follows:
1. A foreign corporation is a U.S. tax resident for any year if fifty
percent or more of its shares, determined by vote or value, was
beneficially owned by U.S. residents on the last day of the
immediately preceding year (or was the average ownership for the
year by U.S. residents as determined by averaging U.S. resident
ownership on the last day of each quarter of the preceding year).
A foreign corporation presumptively satisfies this test if any class
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of its shares is regularly traded in one or more U.S. public capital
markets or is marketed to U.S. persons.
2. This presumption can be rebutted by the foreign corporation
showing that U.S. resident beneficial ownership of its shares is
below the fifty-percent threshold.
3. The presumption can be overcome in the same way by the IRS if
it encounters cases where a foreign corporation that is actually
foreign-owned lists a class of shares on a U.S. exchange in order
to achieve U.S. resident status for tax-avoidance reasons.
This proposed shareholder-ownership test, however, would be an
alternate definition; a corporation would continue to be a U.S. tax
resident if it were formed under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction. Finally,
this Article examines the common objections to a shareholder-based
definition of corporate residence and explains why those objections are
unpersuasive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Unavoidable Challenge
In the U.S. legal system, corporations are intangible fictional
entities created by legal fiat to achieve various ends that are considered
worthwhile. 1 But precisely because corporations are fictional, they do
not live anywhere. 2 Thus, determining where a corporation resides is
a much more difficult endeavor than determining the residence of a
human being.
This difficult query cannot be dodged, however, and it has
foundational significance. It is an accepted international norm that a
country may tax a resident corporation on its worldwide income,
though it may choose not to exercise the full extent of its taxing
jurisdiction. In contrast, a foreign corporation may be taxed only on
income with some nexus to the taxing country. 3 A worldwide taxation

1. A principal reason for the corporate fiction is to promote investments in corporations
by creating a liability shield to protect investors from creditor claims that exceed the amounts
invested, subject to a number of exceptions allowing the corporate liability shield to be pierced.
Within the income tax, corporations serve as a single point for levying the tax that is much more
convenient than pursuing individual shareholders.
2. See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV.
261, 320 (2001) [hereinafter Graetz, Taxing International Income] (“[I]n the case of
corporations, the idea of residence is largely an effort to put flesh into fiction, to find economic
and political substance in a world occupied by legal niceties.”); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Source As
a Solution to Residence, 17 FLA. TAX. REV. 471, 479–80 (2015) (“The difficulty with defining
residency for entities is that the most straightforward way to define residency—physical
presence—is not available, simply because legal entities cannot be physically present in the same
manner as individuals.”). Given this fact, as we understand it, Professor David Elkins,
commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, took the position that the residence of
corporations should be disregarded in determining whether and how to tax corporate income.
Instead, in his view, it is the residence of the shareholders of the corporation that is the relevant
factor in determining the proper tax treatment of corporate income. We look forward to reading
his future paper on this topic.
3. 1 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 412(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).

1683

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

system, which the United States employs in form, 4 observes these
norms by taxing resident corporations on the sum of their domesticsource and foreign-source incomes, 5 while taxing nonresident
corporations only on U.S.-source income. 6 Thus, a worldwide system
rests in part on its classification of a corporation as a resident as
distinguished from a nonresident corporation. 7 The fictional nature of
the corporate form makes this distinction inherently difficult to draw.
It does not seem likely that the United States can avoid this
challenge by moving towards an explicit territorial or exemption
system that would forgo U.S. taxation of foreign-source business
income. This is so because the most viable current territorial proposals
would adopt a form of U.S. final minimum tax on foreign income, 8
under which U.S. taxation of foreign income would still be heavier
than the burden imposed by the tax laws of most other countries, and
the benefit of avoiding U.S. income tax by eroding the U.S. tax base
would remain. 9 Accordingly, a politically plausible U.S. territorial
4. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than
Exemption] (explaining why the U.S. international income taxation system is a worldwide system
in form but largely an incoherent and elective quasi-territorial system in substance).
5. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012).
6. See I.R.C. §§ 881, 882, 864(c)(2)–(3) (2012). However, certain limited categories of
foreign-source income of a nonresident corporation that are closely connected with the conduct
of a U.S. trade or business are subject to U.S. income tax. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4) (2012).
7. In important places, the Internal Revenue Code uses the term “domestic
corporation” to refer to a U.S. corporate resident and the term “foreign corporation” to refer
to a nonresident corporation. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 881(a), 882(a), 7701(a)(4)–(5) (2012). For
this purpose, a domestic corporation is defined as one that is “created or organized in the United
States or under the law of the United States or of any State” and a foreign corporation is any
other corporation. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4)–(5) (2012). The District of Columbia is treated as a
State and as geographically part of the United States for purposes of this definition. I.R.C. §
7701(a)(9)–(10) (2012). For convenience, we refer to domestic corporations as U.S. residents
and foreign corporations as U.S. nonresidents throughout this Article.
8. Representative Camp’s tax reform proposal would have provided for a minimum tax
on foreign income. See H.R. 1, 113th Cong., §§ 4201, 4211 (2014). The Obama
Administration’s framework for corporate tax reform also includes a minimum tax on foreign
income using a different base and tax rate. WHITE HOUSE & U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE
PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 24 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-PresidentsFramework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf.
9. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Designing a 21st
Century Corporate Tax—An Advance U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other Measures
to Protect the Base, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 717–21 (2015) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni,
Designing a 21st Century Corporate Tax]. Professor Adam Rosenzweig has observed that the
question at issue in defining corporate residence is whether a country wants to exercise its taxing
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regime will not eliminate the unavoidable incentives under the current
law for U.S. resident corporations to become nonresidents, nor will it
eliminate the need for an effective U.S. response. 10
A second, and possibly more important, reason why U.S. adoption
of a territorial-based system would not eliminate the need to deal with
the corporate residence conundrum is that conventional territorial
regimes typically have a worldwide taxation component. Specifically,
territorial countries often apply worldwide taxation to passive foreign
income and tax haven business income received by their corporate
residents. 11 Assuming that a U.S. territorial-based system would follow
power, including reporting and withholding obligations, over foreign-source income.
Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 481. Recent corporate inversion activity has illuminated the ability
of a nonresident parent group to also earnings-strip the U.S. tax base. See Stephen E. Shay, J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Treasury’s Unfinished Work on Corporate Expatriations,
150 TAX NOTES 933, 935 (2016) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Treasury’s
Unfinished Work].
10. Professor Omri Marian has pointed out that the concept of corporate residence would
have a critical role in a U.S. territorial regime because the operation of important source rules is
controlled by residence, see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1)–(2), 865(a), (e) (2012), and these rules
are unlikely to be changed. See Omri Marian, The Function of Corporate Tax-Residence in
Territorial Systems, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 157, 159 (2014). While that is correct under current law,
we have argued that source rules are “instruments for implementing source taxing jurisdiction
and effecting residence country accommodation of source country taxation” and could be
modified to suit the appropriate purpose. Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J.
Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—“What’s Source Got to Do with It?”—Source Rules and
U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83, 138–39, 147 (2002) [hereinafter Shay,
Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules]. For this reason, we do not think classification of an entity as
resident is fundamentally linked to determining the source of income.
One might ask whether the United States would adopt the U.S. House of Representatives
Republican tax plan to replace the income tax on business income with a destination-based cash
flow tax (see MAJORITY MEMBERS OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, A BETTER WAY: OUR
VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA, TAX REFORM TASK FORCE BLUEPRINT 24–29 (June 24,
2016), http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf), in
which case the pressure on corporate residence would be reduced. The House Republican
business tax proposal carries a very high revenue cost, would create significant winners and losers,
and has no direct analog in the world today. In addition to being a radical change, there is no
comparable U.S. Senate plan. For these reasons, we do not consider a destination-based cash
flow tax as a replacement for the business income tax to be a likely alternative.
11. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 112TH CONG., JCX-33-11, BACKGROUND
AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT
EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME 8 (2011) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., BACKGROUND AND
ISSUES]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 187, 190 (2005) [hereinafter JOINT
COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE]; U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21 CENTURY 57, 59–60
(2007); HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 447–48 (3d ed. 2010); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA.
ST
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this conventional pattern, the United States would have to address the
issue of properly defining corporate residence in order to implement
the worldwide taxation component of its territorial regime.
B. The Defect of Current U.S. Law
Under present U.S. federal income tax law, a corporation is a
foreign resident if it was formed under foreign law and a U.S. resident
if it was formed under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction. 12 Thus, residence
is elective in the sense that because there are virtually no legal
limitations on the power of relevant business decision makers to
choose between formation in a U.S. or a foreign jurisdiction, U.S. law
effectively gives those decision makers significant discretion in
determining the residence of corporations engaged in
international activities. 13
The most prominent current issue that arises, in part, from the
malleability of the U.S. corporate resident definition, is the inversion
problem. Specifically, a U.S. resident corporation has considerable
latitude to transform itself into a foreign resident by combining with
a foreign corporation if, after the transaction, the former shareholders
of the U.S. corporation own less than eighty percent of the surviving

TAX REV. 699, 717 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income]; Katrin Laschewski &
Christian Laschewski, The Impact of the International Tax System of the Home Country on the
Location Decision of a Foreign Permanent Establishment: The Case of Germany, WORLD TAX J.,
June 2015, at 171, 172–74 (2015); see also Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Designing a 21st Century
Corporate Tax, supra note 9, at 685–86 (noting that all countries’ international tax systems are
hybrids that contain elements of both the worldwide and territorial approaches).
12. See supra note 7.
13. Studies have shown that despite the few legal limitations on the power to choose
between foreign and U.S. incorporation, U.S. headquartered corporations that engage in
international activities are, in fact, usually formed in a U.S. jurisdiction. See Eric J. Allen & Susan
C. Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet, 66 NAT’L
TAX J. 395, 406–09 (2013); Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial
Incorporation Location, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 319, 329–33 (2013) (discussing how U.S.-based
startups are also generally incorporated in the United States); see also DANIEL N. SHAVIRO,
FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 69–75 (2014) [hereinafter SHAVIRO, FIXING]
(discussing non-tax factors that lead to U.S. incorporation); Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen,
Innovation and Taxation at Start-up Firms, 69 TAX L. REV. 357, 360–61 (2016) (model
suggesting tax planning, including using a pass-through entity, may not be cost effective for
start-ups but more plausible after a start-up receives external financing). Nevertheless, it is clear
that if the relevant decision makers determine that the tax benefits of foreign incorporation are
sufficiently attractive, they have substantial freedom to elect foreign incorporation, particularly
for foreign-headquartered subsidiaries.
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foreign corporation. 14 As a result of this metamorphosis, a former U.S.
corporation’s future foreign-source income can avoid becoming
subject to U.S. tax, and the surviving foreign corporation can pursue
an earnings stripping strategy. 15 That is, the surviving foreign
corporation can extract deductible interest, royalties, and service fee
payments from its U.S. subsidiaries. 16 Because these payments are
deductible, U.S. tax is avoided pro tanto. 17
Inversions, however, are not the only problematic transactions
that result from the manipulability of the U.S. corporate residence
definition. For example, assume that USCorp, formed under the laws
of Delaware, contemplates building a new factory to sell products to
U.S. consumers. USCorp can employ an Irish subsidiary to build,
own, and operate the factory, and then have that subsidiary sell its
output to USCorp. Aggressive transfer pricing can then be used
regarding the Irish subsidiary’s sales to USCorp so that much of the
profit from exploiting the U.S. market is income of the Irish
14. See I.R.C. §§ 7874(a)(2), 7874(b) (2012).
15. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Getting
Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Framework, 93 N.C.
L. REV. 673, 680–86 (2015) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Earnings Stripping]
(explaining and illustrating the earnings stripping problem).
16. Id. at 681 n.19 and accompanying text.
17. See generally id. at 680–87 (explaining and illustrating, again, the earnings stripping
problem). Adoption of a U.S. territorial system would not eliminate the benefit of earnings
stripping. Because the top U.S. corporate rate is, even after a reduction to, say 25 percent, likely
to remain substantially above the top rate in reasonably stable tax havens (e.g., Bermuda, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom), see JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743,
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1, 16–18
(2014); MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44013,
CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFITS SHIFTING (BEPS): AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DATA 21 (2015), it would continue to be worthwhile from a tax minimization point of view to
use deductible payments to move income from the U.S. tax base to related tax haven
corporations even if the United States adopts a territorial regime. Indeed, adoption of a U.S.
territorial system would increase the incentive to strip earnings out of the U.S. tax base. See
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Earnings Stripping, supra note 15, at 684. Thus, strengthened antiearnings stripping rules are necessary, even if the United States goes territorial. As stated by
Willard Taylor:
Inversions are not, and never were, solely about voting-with-your feet, or electing
into, an exemption system of taxation for foreign business income. . . . A dollar earned
in the United States is taxed at a 35 percent rate but if paid as interest to the new Irish
parent is taxed at a 12.5 percent rate at most (and is not subject to withholding under
the U.S.-Ireland treaty.) This has little to do with whether or not the United States
adopts an exemption or territorial system . . . .
Willard B. Taylor, Letter to the Editor, A Comment on Eric Solomon’s Article on Corporate
Inversions, TAX NOTES, Oct. 1, 2012, at 105, 105.
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subsidiary. Because the Irish subsidiary is a nonresident of the United
States under current U.S. law, this foreign-source income will bear no
U.S. tax until it is paid to USCorp in the form of dividends or until
USCorp sells the Irish subsidiary’s stock at a price that reflects its
accumulated income. 18 The significant value of this deferral of U.S. tax
is well-recognized. 19 Moreover, there is no guarantee that the Irish
subsidiary will actually pay out a substantial amount of its profits as
dividends or that its stock will be sold.
C. Relevance to Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation
In short, the present U.S. definition of corporate residence makes
it easy to transform what would otherwise be foreign active business
income of U.S. corporations into foreign active business income that
escapes a current U.S. tax. This fact has implications that go beyond
the inversion phenomenon. To be specific, because foreign corporate
residence, and corresponding freedom from U.S. tax with respect to
foreign-source active business income are substantially elective, this
might suggest that the only corporate income that the United States
can feasibly tax is U.S.-source income. And, consequently, as the
argument goes, the United States should accept this reality by
abandoning efforts to employ worldwide taxation and, instead, adopt
a territorial system under which U.S. taxing jurisdiction over foreignsource active business income would be formally surrendered. 20
If this were the case, would a necessary implication also be that
the United States should deviate from common practice by structuring
its territorial regime so that passive and tax haven income are also

18. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH,
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 303 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the operation
of the deferral principle).
19. See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 4, at 96–104
(discussing the value of the deferral principle); see also SHAVIRO, FIXING, supra note 13, at 55
(characterizing deferral as a “tax preference”); Patrick Driessen, Would Territoriality Be a Tax
Expenditure?, 146 TAX NOTES 647, 649 (2015) (characterizing deferral as a “tax expenditure”).
This deferral rule is sometimes called the “deferral privilege.” See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
Worse Than Exemption, supra note 4, at 85–87. The Subpart F (see I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (2012))
and passive foreign investment company (PFIC) (see I.R.C. §§ 1291–1298 (2012)) anti-deferral
regimes of current U.S. tax law would not prevent deferral from applying in this fact scenario.
See I.R.C. §§ 954(d)(1), 1297(d) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4) (2010).
20. See SHAVIRO, FIXING, supra note 13, at 66 (stating, but not endorsing,
this argument).
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exempted from U.S. tax instead of being subject to
worldwide taxation?
The preceding two suggestions follow from the premise that there
is no feasible definition of corporate residence that is less manipulable
than the current U.S. definition. We reject that premise and the
related suggestions.
With respect to worldwide taxation, we have argued in prior
work 21 that the United States unilaterally 22 should adopt a real
worldwide system for taxing the foreign income of U.S. multinational
enterprises (MNEs). 23 Under such a system, the foreign-source and
U.S.-source income of a U.S. parent corporation and all of its
domestic and controlled foreign subsidiaries would be aggregated and
subjected to a current, nondeferred U.S. income tax. There would be
a credit for foreign income tax payments, subject to the U.S. foreign

21. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 1, 8, 18–20 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Lipstick]; J. Clifton Fleming
Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives on the Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation
Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079, 1081–82 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
Perspectives]; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About
Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Income Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 458
(1999) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious]; see also Robert J. Peroni, Back to
the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 975, 989–94 (1997) (recommending that the United States strengthen its worldwide
system and proposing a pass-through system for taxing U.S. persons’ foreign-source income
earned through a foreign corporation).
22. Multilateral harmonization of income tax laws would make a significant contribution
towards resolving the problems of international income taxation. However, we do not anticipate
major steps towards harmonization within the foreseeable future. Indeed, we agree with
Professor Michael Graetz’s view that “international tax competition dominates international tax
law making. . . . [D]isparities in different countries’ circumstances and interests make ongoing
inter-nation competition far more likely than substantially more robust international
cooperation—at least for the foreseeable future.” MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY:
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION xix (2016). Consequently, we see the need for the
United States to develop unilateral reforms to its international income taxation system, including
a reformed definition of U.S. corporate residence.
23. The most basic MNEs are parent/subsidiary structures or pairs of corporations whose
stock is owned by the same party or parties (i.e., the brother/sister structure). There are virtually
endless combinations and permutations of these basic patterns. For purposes of this Article, an
MNE is a parent/subsidiary group of corporations that functions as an economic unit, with at
least one member being engaged in business activity outside the country in which the MNE
parent is a resident for tax purposes.
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tax credit limitation. 24 However, under a real worldwide system,
foreign tax imposed by high-tax foreign countries in excess of U.S. tax
would not be cross-credited against the U.S. residual tax 25 on income
earned in low-tax foreign countries. Therefore, the foreign tax credit
limitation of current law would need to be modified to significantly
reduce cross-crediting. This approach would greatly lessen present
law’s distortive incentive to choose low-tax foreign countries as
locations for business or investment activity. 26 It would also end the
so-called “lockout effect” of current law, 27 align U.S. international
income taxation more closely with the ability-to-pay principle that
underlies the choice of income as the primary U.S. federal tax base, 28
and allow the United States to collect a residual tax on income earned
by U.S. MNEs in low-tax foreign countries. However, in order to
function properly, a real worldwide system needs a robust and nonelective definition of corporate residence. Thus, a major objective of
this Article is to bolster the case for real worldwide taxation by
proposing the required definition.

24. See generally I.R.C. § 904 (2012) (specifying the core rules of the foreign tax credit
limitation). For a comprehensive discussion of the foreign tax credit limitation, see J. KUNTZ &
R. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ B4.16 (Westlaw 2016) (ebook).
25. A residual tax is the U.S. income tax liability that exceeds any allowable credit for
foreign income tax payments on foreign-source income. See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH,
supra note 18, at 307.
26. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 20 (2013) [hereinafter CBO, OPTIONS]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, JCX-42-11, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES IN U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER
INCOME 103 (2011) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME]; Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Perspectives, supra note 21, at 1084–85.
27. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 26, at 20; JOINT COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME,
supra note 26, at 103; J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the Foreign Tax
Credit Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax – What’s ETI Repeal Got to Do with It?,
104 TAX NOTES 1393, 1406, 1414 (2004). One of us has defined “lockout” as “the
phenomenon of U.S. multinational enterprises retaining low-taxed foreign earnings in foreign
subsidiaries to benefit from deferral of U.S. taxation.” Stephen E. Shay, The Truthiness of
‘Lockout’: A Review of What We Know, 146 TAX NOTES 1393, 1393 (2015).
28. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV.
299, 306–27 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness] (discussing in detail the
relationship between worldwide taxation and the ability-to-pay concept); Fleming, Peroni &
Shay, Perspectives, supra note 21, at 1091–01; see also AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE
MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE 8–15 (2013) (tracing the rise of the ability-to-pay concept
as a fundamental pillar of taxation in the United States).
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D. Inversions
Developing a sensible and less manipulable definition of corporate
residence can also be a critical element in dealing with inversions. For
example, in the typical corporate inversion scenario, the corporate
headquarters of the departing U.S. corporation remains in the United
States. 29 Thus, if the United States were to adopt headquarters
location as an alternative definition of corporate residence (i.e., a
corporation would be a U.S. resident if it either was formed under the
law of a U.S. jurisdiction or was headquartered in the United States),
many inversions might be deterred. This approach has been previously
suggested 30 but, as explained below, 31 we ultimately conclude that
there is a better pathway to the same end.
E. Corporate Integration
Recently, corporate tax reform plans that propose integrating the
separate corporate-level and investor-level taxes on corporate income
into a unified regime that achieves single taxation of corporate income
have been touted as partial or total cures for the inversion problem.32
None of these plans, however, would obviate the need for a reformed
corporate residence definition.
The first reason for this conclusion is that integration plans
generally do not apply to income earned by foreign corporations.33

29. For descriptions of various inversion transactions, see Bret Wells, Cant and the
Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 429, 430–36 (2012)
[hereinafter Wells, Inconvenient Truth].
30. See e.g., JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE, supra note 11, at 179–80; see also
Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1643–47 (2013)
[hereinafter Marian, Jurisdiction].
31. See infra Part III.
32. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, David Burton, Curtis Dubay, David S. Miller, Steven T.
Miller, Stuart L. Rosow, Eric Toder, Alan D. Viard & Richard A. Westin, Is Corporate Integration
a Good Idea?, 151 TAX NOTES 1697, 1698–99 (2016) (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, David Burton,
and Curtis Dubay describing and analyzing the desirability of, and methods for achieving,
corporate integration); Kat Lucero, Hatch Calls Regs Counterproductive, 151 TAX NOTES 157,
157 (2016).
33. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME
ONCE 17, 37, 48, 95 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTEGRATION REPORT]; STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-44-16, OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TO CORPORATE
INTEGRATION 37 (2016) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., INTEGRATION].
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Thus, they rely on a classification that distinguishes foreign
corporations from U.S. resident corporations.
More importantly, feasible integration schemes actually impose
some degree of corporate-level taxation on the worldwide incomes of
U.S. corporations unless implementation of integration is coupled
with adoption of a territorial system. 34 Without territoriality, these
plans perpetuate the incentives for U.S. corporations to invert into
low-taxed foreign corporations or to put their new activities into lowtaxed foreign subsidiaries in order to escape U.S. tax on foreign-source
income and achieve other inversion benefits. 35 Thus, unless the United
States were to enact a territorial system (and we recommend against
doing so), a robust definition of U.S. corporate residence would be
necessary even if the United States were to adopt a corporate
integration plan.

34. An integration system that imposes a corporate-level tax and then relieves dividends
from taxation obviously imposes a corporate level-tax on the worldwide income of U.S. resident
corporations unless a territorial system, which exempts foreign active business income, is
adopted. See generally U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 17, 39–41
(describing how a corporation’s foreign-source income would be treated under a corporate
integration system that relieves dividends from taxation); Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, supra note 4, at 82 (explaining that a territorial regime does not tax foreign business
income). Integration systems that impose a corporate-level tax but that give U.S. resident
corporations a deduction for dividend payments or that allow U.S. shareholders a credit for
corporate tax payments related to corporate income distributions effectively apply a corporatelevel tax to undistributed worldwide income, assuming no territorial system. See id. at 95; JOINT
COMM., INTEGRATION, supra note 33, at 34; see also John D. McDonald, A Taxing History—
Why U.S. Corporate Tax Policy Needs to Come Full Circle and Once Again Reflect the Reality of
the Individual as Taxpayer, 94 TAXES 93, 97 (2016) (“[I]ntegration alone is not sufficient. If
the United States continues to impose tax on corporations, corporate managers will continue to
have an incentive to erode the U.S. tax base and re-domicile to more favorable
tax jurisdictions.”).
35. For an explanation of the various forms of inversions and their tax advantages under
current U.S. law, see DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43568, CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 3–5, 10–11
(2016); DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31444, FIRMS THAT
INCORPORATE ABROAD FOR TAX PURPOSES: CORPORATE “INVERSIONS” AND “EXPATRIATION”
3–4 (updated 2007); Steven H. Goldman, Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX
REV. 71, 73–76 (2008); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Treasury’s Unfinished Work, supra note 9, at
935; Eric Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of Larger Tax System Problems, 136 TAX
NOTES 1449 (2012); Steven M. Surdell, Inversions 2014—Self Help International Tax Reform
for U.S. Multinationals?, 92 TAXES 63 (2014); Wells, Inconvenient Truth, supra note 29, at 430–
36; Bret Wells, What Corporate Inversions Teach About International Tax Reform, 127 TAX
NOTES 1345, 1349–51 (2010).
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F. The Way Forward
Consequently, a principled, efficient, and practical definition of
corporate residence is required even if some form of corporate
integration is adopted. More importantly, such a definition is a key
element in designing either a real worldwide or a territorial income
tax system and is also a potential restraint on the inversion
phenomenon. Professor Omri Marian has recently published an
extensive analysis and evaluation of the alternative approaches for
defining corporate residence. 36 In this Article, we take a somewhat
different approach from Professor Marian, although we view his work
and this Article as mutually supportive overall. We focus on developing
a robust U.S. concept of corporate residence that is based on the
premise that the U.S. corporate income tax serves principally as a
device to limit rate gaming and deferral by indirectly imposing a
current tax on shareholders.
Specifically, we will argue that the best remedy for the current
inversion problems created by the U.S. definition of corporate
residence, and the best approach to strengthening the case for a U.S.
system of real worldwide taxation, is to amend the U.S. definition of
corporate residence. Under our proposed amendment, a corporation
is a U.S. resident for income tax purposes if it was formed under the
laws of a U.S. jurisdiction, or at least fifty percent of its shares, by vote
or value, is owned by U.S. residents. This approach would reduce the
manipulability of the current U.S. definition and counter the
argument that real worldwide taxation is unattainable because there is
no feasible, non-elective definition of corporate residence. This
approach would also prevent U.S. corporations from successfully
inverting by merging into smaller foreign corporations. This is because
the surviving corporation, being substantially owned by U.S.
residents, would itself be a U.S. resident. Thus, both its foreign-source
income and its earnings stripping receipts would remain in the U.S.
tax base. Our proposal would also deal with situations where a U.S.
corporation uses a low-taxed foreign subsidiary to manufacture goods

36. See generally Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30. Professor Marian proposes a
definition that would treat a corporation as a U.S. resident if either (1) it is managed or
controlled from the United States, or (2) its securities are listed on a U.S. exchange or it is
controlled by a corporation, the securities of which are listed on a U.S. exchange. Id. at 1618.
Although we prefer our own approach to determining corporate residency set forth in this
Article, we believe that Professor Marian’s approach would be a considerable improvement over
existing U.S. tax law.
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for sale into the U.S. market. Because a U.S. parent would own the
foreign subsidiary, it would be a U.S. resident and all income shifted
to it would be part of the U.S. tax base.
Finally, our proposal has a simplification benefit. This is because
all foreign corporations controlled by U.S. residents would themselves
be U.S. residents subject to current worldwide taxation. Thus, if
comprehensive stock ownership attribution rules were employed for
purposes of defining control, there would be no need for Subpart F.
Moreover, there would be a great reduction in the population of
foreign corporations to which measures for abolishing deferral would
have to apply. It would be possible to de-link the residence
classification of a parent corporation from its wholly owned
subsidiaries where the earnings of a foreign subsidiary corporation
would, as under current law, eventually be taxed by the United States.
While our preference would be to extend the residence classification
to subsidiaries, the proposal retains its importance even if it only were
applied to the parent corporation of a controlled group.
Our proposal would not, however, address foreign corporations
that pursue earnings stripping benefits by acquiring smaller U.S.
corporations. That problem would have to be dealt with through
legislation that specifically attacks earnings stripping. We have made
relevant suggestions in our earlier work. 37
Although the details of our proposal differ from Professor
Marian’s, 38 we agree with him on a very important basic point: it is
feasible to construct a coherent and non-elective definition of
corporate residence.
II. WHY A SHAREHOLDER-BASED DEFINITION?
A. Why a Corporate Income Tax?
As indicated in the introduction, we advocate a shareholder-based
residence approach as a supplement to place-of-incorporation as the
U.S. definition of corporate residence. To explain our choice, we must
begin by investigating the reasons for a corporate income tax.

37. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Earnings Stripping, supra note 15, at 723–37.
38. See supra note 36.
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The corporate income tax originated in the progressive era as a
device to impose a measure of public control on corporate behavior.39
The rationale was that because corporate income tax returns were
public documents under this early regime, corporate operations would
attract governmental and public scrutiny, which would facilitate
regulation of corporate behavior. 40 This justification vanished,
however, when corporate opposition resulted in repeal of the
requirement for public disclosure of returns. 41
Nevertheless, the corporate income tax, minus return disclosure,
has been rationalized in modern times as a device to regulate corporate
behavior. 42 The thought is that by limiting the buildup of wealth
within corporations and providing positive incentives through tax
expenditures and disincentives through denial of deductions and
credits, the tax system can shape corporate behavior. 43 The large net
worths and cash holdings of U.S. corporations, however, indicate that
the corporate income tax has not been a meaningful restraint on
accumulations of corporate wealth. 44 And, while the corporate income
tax has undeniably affected corporate decisions regarding the location
and composition of business activity, 45 its role has been limited outside
of the business domain. In addition, it has had little or no effect on
closely related issues such as restraining executive compensation.46

39. See Marjorie Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 53–57 (1990).
40. See id. at 133–35.
41. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax: A Persistent Challenge, 11 FLA. TAX
REV. 73, 81 (2011).
42. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1246–49 (2004); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Letter to
the Editor, Tax Reform in the (Multi) National Interest, 124 TAX NOTES 389 (2009) (justifying
the corporate income tax as a charge for the burdens placed on society by corporate activities).
This is an alternative way to describe both a penalty tax and a benefits tax.
43. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
TAX POLICY 15–17 (2015) (describing the impact of tax provisions on corporate
investment decisions).
44. See Adam Davidson, Why Are Corporations Hoarding Trillions?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Jan. 20, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/magazine/why-are-corporations-hoardingtrillions.html.
45. See, e.g., CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 26, at 12.
46. For example, studies suggest that the $1 million deductibility cap in Section 162(m)
of the Code has had little effect on overall executive compensation levels or compensation
growth rates at corporate taxpayers subject to the cap. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose & Catherine
Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation (Nat’l
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Moreover, the corporate income tax has played little, if any, role in
causing corporations to significantly address the most pressing social
and environmental problems of the United States. 47 At best, the
limited role of the corporate income tax in relation to corporate social
behavior is not a persuasive justification for a thirty-five percent tax on
corporate income.
Various benefit rationales have also been advanced in support of
the U.S. corporate income tax. 48 The principal problem with those
rationales, however, is that there is no obvious linkage between the tax
a U.S. resident corporation pays to the U.S. Treasury and the
government benefits enjoyed by that corporation. 49 With respect to
the benefits of operating in the legal form of a corporation, those
advantages, including limited liability, are largely available to limited
liability companies and other forms of unincorporated business
enterprise, such as the limited liability partnership, without payment
of entity-level tax. 50 Benefits rationales are simply inadequate to justify

Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7842, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7842.pdf.
47. We would identify, inter alia, curbing race, gender, and other forms of discrimination,
protecting the environment, addressing America’s decaying infrastructure, increasing the
achievements of American students in comparison to those of other countries, and reducing
American poverty as problems largely or completely unaddressed by the U.S. corporate
income tax.
48. See, e.g., Reporters’ Study, Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, AM. LAW INST.,
49, 51–54 (1999) [hereinafter ALI, PRIVATE ENTERPRISES] (acknowledging the argument that
a separate corporate tax is justified as a charge for the benefit of limited shareholder liability, but
finding the argument unpersuasive); Calvin H. Johnson, Replace the Corporate Tax with a Market
Capitalization Tax, 117 TAX NOTES 1082 (2007) (arguing that a separate corporate tax for
publicly traded corporations is justified as a tax on the liquidity benefit of access to public
securities markets); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?,
39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 994 (1988–89) (earlier work taking a similar position).
49. See, e.g., ALI, PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra, note 48, at 60 (“[T]here is no indication
that the amount of the tax properly reflects the value of the benefit.”); Harry Grubert & Rosanne
Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International
Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 707 (2013) (“The corporate tax is not generally characterized as a
benefit tax.”); Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The
Tensions Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA.
TAX REV. 475 (2005) (expressing doubts that the benefits of incorporating in the United States
justify the worldwide taxation of corporate income).
50. See Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1659 (“[I]t probably makes little sense to
argue that the current purpose of corporate taxes in the United States is to tax the benefits of
incorporation. Under the ‘check the box’ regulations, the U.S. is explicitly willing to grant such
benefits without charging anything for them.”). The “check-the-box” entity classification
regulations in Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701(2)–(3) (2016) largely make corporate status elective for
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the modern U.S. corporate income tax with respect to U.S.
resident corporations. 51
The U.S. corporate income tax has also been justified as a tax on
economic rents earned by businesses operating in corporate form.52
This rationale fails, however, because “the corporate income tax as
currently applied is not a tax on pure profits or economic rents.” 53
Finally, it has been observed that the U.S. corporate income tax
enjoys the virtue of convenience—it is easier to collect tax on
corporate income at the entity level instead of pursuing the
shareholders. 54 This rationale, however, is a tacit admission that the
corporate income tax is actually a tax on shareholders. We agree with
that characterization.
In earlier work, 55 we concluded that the principle of ability-topay 56 provides the primary justification for the income tax on
individuals 57 and that the U.S. individual income tax is, in fact, based
on the ability-to-pay principle. 58 We then explained that without a tax
on C corporation 59 income at a rate that is substantial in comparison
to individual tax rates, individuals with capital to invest in corporate
shares could undermine the ability-to-pay principle by earning income
through C corporations that bears less tax than the tax borne by others

federal income tax purposes, even for forms of business enterprises that possess significant nontax
corporate attributes, such as limited liability and centralized management.
51. We have argued that U.S. source taxation of nonresident corporations is justifiable on
the basis of a benefits rationale, see Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 10, at 88–
106, but that is a quite different situation from that of a U.S. resident corporation.
52. See MARK P. KEIGHTLY & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42726,
THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 15 (2014).
53. Id.
54. See ALI PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra note 48, at 76; McDonald, supra note 34, at
127–28.
55. See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 28 (discussing the
application of the ability-to-pay principle to international income taxation).
56. In this Article, we define the ability-to-pay principle as a norm dictating that a taxpayer
with a larger net income in a particular year should pay more income tax for that year than is
paid by a taxpayer with a smaller net income for the same year and, at politically agreed levels,
proportionately more tax. For a discussion of nuances of this norm, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
Fairness, supra note 28, at 301 n.1.
57. See id. at 301–02.
58. See id. at 302.
59. For purposes of this Article, a C corporation is an incorporated entity that pays a
corporate tax under I.R.C. § 11 (2012). However, we exclude for this purpose entities subject
to defacto pass-through treatment such as regulated investment companies and real estate
investment trusts.

1697

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

who have the same or less ability to pay. They could do this by taking
advantage of deferral of tax on corporate income until dividends are
paid or shares are sold 60 at the cost of a comparatively low corporate
tax, or at no cost at all if the corporate income tax does not exist. 61 A
substantial tax on C corporation income is a limitation on this strategy
if corporate income tax is a meaningful burden on shareholders. 62
Although the incidence of the corporate income tax is a longrunning controversy, 63 recent work concludes that most of the burden

60. See J.D.R. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 8 (1977) (explaining that a
justification for corporation taxes is that otherwise company profits would escape taxation if the
income was not distributed to shareholders); KEIGHTLY & SHERLOCK, supra note 52, at 15
(noting that corporations would be incentivized to retain earnings in order to avoid taxes if not
for a corporate income tax); U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at
95 (explaining that under the imputation credit corporate integration system, shareholders will
not be required to pay additional tax on distributions of corporate earnings that have already
been taxed under the corporate tax); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case for
Dividend Deduction, 65 TAX LAW. 3, 7 (2011) (explaining that one argument in favor of the
corporate tax is that without it, owners would be able to defer the tax, which would effectively
reduce their tax rate); Daniel I. Halperin, Mitigating the Potential Inequity of Reducing
Corporate Rates, 126 TAX Notes, 641, 641–42 (2010) (explaining that without a corporate tax,
the top marginal rate would be the highest individual rate); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of
Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 138–39, 159–60 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons]
(arguing that the corporate income tax is a substitute taxation by which the owners are taxed on
a current basis by taxing the entity); Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 478–79; see also David A.
Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and Doctrine in the
Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 217 (2007) (“If we imposed only an individual-level income
tax with the realization requirement, individuals could park assets in shell corporations and avoid
taxes on capital income. Firm-level taxes, whether collected at the firm level or calculated at the
firm level and passed through to owners, can be seen as a necessary back-up to individual-level
income taxes that rely on realization.”).
61. See JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34229, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4–5 (2012) (explaining that
without a high corporate tax rate, individuals may obtain a lower tax rate by using the
corporation as a tax shelter).
62. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra, note 28, at 320–21. In earlier work, we
stated that the corporate income tax “cannot be explained on ability-to-pay grounds because
liability under the corporate-level tax is calibrated to the taxable income of the corporation and
bears no necessary relationship to the respective abilities to pay of any individuals.” Id. at 319.
This language is inartful and creates a misimpression. By it we meant that the corporate income
tax is not directly based on the ability-to-pay of either the corporation or the shareholders.
Instead, as explained in this Article, our view is that the corporate income tax serves as a defense
against attempts to undermine the ability-to-pay principle and, therefore, is justified by
that principle.
63. For an early discussion of this controversy, see William A. Klein, The Incidence of the
Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer’s View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 WISC. L. REV. 576.
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of this tax falls on owners of capital, including shareholders. 64 Thus, a
substantial corporate income tax serves as a restraint on use of the C
corporation to undermine the ability-to-pay principle. To be sure, it is
a crude restraint in that its primary incidence falls on capital
generally, 65 not just on shareholders, and its rates are not calibrated to
either the rates of individual shareholders or the length of time the
individual tax on dividends or gains from share sales is deferred. 66
Nevertheless, there is nothing better and so the corporate income tax
serves as a second best limitation on the capacity of investors to
minimize the effects of the ability-to-pay principle by strategically
employing C corporations.
The preceding analysis, however, must be re-examined in light
of recent work showing that approximately seventy-five percent of
U.S. C corporation equity is owned by tax-exempt shareholders that

64. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND
FEDERAL TAXES, 2013, at 26 (2016) (“CBO allocated 75 percent of corporate income taxes to
owners of capital in proportion to their income from interest, dividends, rents, and adjusted
capital gains . . . . CBO allocated the remaining 25 percent of corporate income taxes to workers
in proportion to their labor income.”); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-14–13,
MODELING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES ON BUSINESS INCOME 30 (2013) (Joint Committee
Staff regards owners of capital as bearing 100 percent of the corporate income tax burden in the
short run and 75 percent of corporate income taxes in the long run with the remainder not
distributed to domestic and foreign owners of capital being borne by labor); GRAVELLE &
HUNGERFORD, supra note 61, at 29 (“[I]t appears that most of the burden of the corporate tax
falls on capital (and were debt considered, it is possible that labor benefits from the tax).”); JIM
NUNNS, URBAN INST. AND URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., HOW TPC DISTRIBUTES
THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 10 (2012) (“TPC’s updated long-run incidence assumptions for
the corporate income tax are that 60 percent . . . falls on supernormal returns, 20 percent on
labor income, and 20 percent on the normal return to all capital. . . . We assume the burden on
supernormal returns falls only on shareholders . . . .”); Julie Anne Cronin, Emily Y. Lin, Laura
Power & Michael Cooper, Distributing the Corporate Income Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury
Methodology, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 239, 239–40 (2013) (U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Tax
Analysis assumes that 82 percent of the corporate income tax is borne by capital income and 18
percent is borne by labor); Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of General
Equilibrium Estimates and Analysis, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 185, 211 (2013) (describing an approach
that treats over 90 percent of the corporate tax burden as borne by domestic capital); Li Liu &
Rosanne Altshuler, Measuring the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax Under Imperfect
Competition, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 215, 233 (2013) (“The average labor share of the corporate tax
burden is around 60–80 percent.”). But see Kimberly A. Clausing, Who Pays the Corporate Tax
in a Global Economy?, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 151, 180 (2013) (“[T]here is very little robust evidence
linking corporate tax rates and wages.”).
65. See authorities cited in supra note 64.
66. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 28, at 319 n.46.
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do not pay tax on dividend income or gains from stock sales. 67 Thus,
with respect to these shareholders, the corporate income tax cannot
be rationalized as a measure that prevents investors from minimizing
their shareholder-level tax liability.
Nevertheless, we conclude that even as to the portion of the
corporate income tax that is borne by tax-exempt shareholders, the
tax is effectively an indirect levy on those shareholders. Our analysis
runs this way: there is no normative right to income tax exemption for
charities, other non-profits, and retirement plans. 68 Tax relief granted
to those entities is thus a subsidy provided to achieve various ends.69
Given the absence of a norm, Congress is free to decide the degree of
subsidy that it is willing to provide to exempt entities. Its decision is
that tax-exempt entities are not wholly tax-exempt. They generally are
excused from federal income tax on their unlevered dividends and
gains from share sales, 70 but they must bear tax on unrelated business
taxable income as well as corporate-level tax on the income that is
earned through their corporate equity investments 71 (except to the
extent that the corporate income tax is shifted to other forms of capital
and to labor). 72 Thus, the corporate income tax turns out to be a
burden even on tax-exempt shareholders, although not for reasons
directly related to ability-to-pay. 73
Of course, this analysis heightens the incongruous treatment of
interest received on corporate debt held by tax-exempt entities. In
general, this interest is deductible 74 by the corporate payors. Thus, it

67. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S.
Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 930 (2016).
68. See Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV.
283, 286 (2011).
69. See id. at 301–02 (“[A] normal income tax generally would impose a tax burden on
investment income. Thus, failure to tax such income earned by a charity represents a subsidy.”).
70. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (2012).
71. See I.R.C. § 11 (2012).
72. See authorities cited in supra note 64. The issue of whether the existence and scope
of the tax subsidy accorded tax-exempt organizations is appropriate is an important and large
topic that is outside the scope of this Article.
73. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-26-05, TESTIMONY OF GEORGE K. YIN,
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AT A HEARING OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON “AN OVERVIEW OF THE TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR” 2–4
(2005) (discussing the reasons for tax exemptions).
74. The general deduction provision for interest expense is I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012). The
exceptions are I.R.C. § 163(f), (h), (i), (j), (l) (2012).

1700

1681

Defending Worldwide Taxation

does not directly bear the corporate-level income tax; 75 it bears that
tax only to the extent that there is shifting from corporate equity
investments to debt capital. 76 There does not appear to be much of a
shift, however, because the Congressional Research Service has found
that “[t]he aggregate tax burden on debt is slightly negative, while
equity is taxed at close to 40%.” 77 Assuming that is the case, corporate
debt investments by tax-exempt entities bear less of a corporate
income tax burden than the corporate equity investments of those
entities. If that is true, however, it is equally true with respect to the
corporate debt investments and corporate equity investments of
taxable investors and it does nothing more than illustrate the
longstanding inconsistent tax treatment of corporate debt and
corporate equity. 78 This is an incongruity that seems unlikely to be
eliminated in the near term and that requires remediation that is
clearly outside the scope of this Article.
For purposes of this Article, we conclude that the best rationale
for a substantial tax on corporate income is that it is a tool (1) to
crudely interdict efforts by taxable equity investors to undermine the
ability-to-pay principle 79 and (2) to limit the degree of subsidy
provided to tax-exempt equity investors. With respect to both types
of investors, therefore, the target of the corporate income tax is a
corporation’s shareholders.
B. A Shareholder Tax Leads to a Shareholder-Based
Residence Definition
The above discussion concludes that direct or indirect
shareholders are the ultimate targets of the U.S. tax on corporate
income. For that reason, the task of properly defining corporate
residence should focus on constructing a definition that reflects the
75. See GRAVELLE & HUNGERFORD, supra note 61, at 33 (“[A]t the firm level, equity is
subject to a tax rate of around 30% while debt is subsidized at about the same level (a negative
32% tax rate).”). We exclude interest from a controlled entity taxable under I.R.C.
§ 512(b)(13) (2012).
76. See authorities cited in supra note 64.
77. See GRAVELLE & HUNGERFORD, supra note 61, at 32.
78. See id. at 32–33.
79. See id. at 4 (“As long as taxes on individual income are imposed, a significant corporate
income tax is likely to be necessary to forestall use of the corporation as a tax shelter.”).
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centrality of shareholder residence. This is not a radical idea. The
United States has already moved toward a shareholder-based
corporate residence definition by adopting Section 7874. This section
provides that if the foreign surviving corporation in an inversion is at
least eighty percent owned (based on either the vote or value of its
stock) by former shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation, then
the foreign corporation will be considered a U.S. resident. 80
The conclusion that the United States should adopt a shareholderbased definition of corporate residence means that there must be rules
defining the residence of shareholders. Determining the precise
contour of those rules is a large, independent topic that is outside the
scope of this Article, 81 and so we do not undertake to craft those rules
in this work. Instead, we limit ourselves to observing that in present
law there are useful starting points in Section 7701(b) with respect to
individual shareholders, Section 7701(a)(4) and (a)(5) with respect to
incorporated tax-exempt organizations, and Section 7701(a)(30)(E)
and (a)(31)(B) with respect to tax-exempt trusts.
III. A SHAREHOLDER-BASED DEFINITION IS FEASIBLE
A. The Frequent Trading Objection
A shareholder-based definition of corporate residence is clearly
feasible with respect to closely held corporations because information
regarding shareholder identity and residence will usually be readily
available. Some commentators, however, argue that because
ownership of the shares of publicly traded corporations changes
frequently, shareholder residence is unworkable as a test for the tax
residence of publicly held entities. 82 While this argument would have
some traction if the object were to accurately attribute corporate
income to various shareholders, that is not the goal with respect to
determining corporate residence. To illustrate, we recommend that
the United States adopt a rule that treats a corporation as a U.S.

80. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2012).
81. For example, there is a significant body of literature dealing with whether individuals
who are U.S. citizens but who have no physical presence in the United States should be treated
as U.S. residents for income tax purposes. See, e.g., Michael Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment
of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117 (2014); Ruth
Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016).
82. See GRAETZ, supra note 22, at 140; Graetz, Taxing International Income, supra note
2, at 323; Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S.
Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 415 (2010).
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resident for any year if on the last day of the preceding year, fifty
percent or more of its shares (determined by vote or value) is owned
by U.S. residents. Under this rule, frequent share trading during the
year would be irrelevant because the rule would operate on the basis
of a snapshot taken at the end of the immediately preceding year. If
such a rule were judged vulnerable to year-end gaming, then it could
be modified to operate on the basis of the average of the snapshots
taken on the last day of each quarter during the preceding year. In any
event, frequent share trading would not hamper the rule’s operation.
Moreover, this snapshot approach would be feasible because we would
be determining the aggregate extent to which foreign corporations’
equity is U.S. owned, not the shares of their incomes that should be
attributed to specific shareholders (an admittedly more difficult task).
Because the shares of U.S. corporations are predominantly in the
hands of U.S. residents, 83 it is unlikely that share trading would cause
a corporation to frequently change from resident to nonresident, and
vice versa, on account of the corporation often finding itself on
different sides of the fifty-percent line proposed above. If that were a
concern, however, averaging share ownership snapshots over a threeor five-year period for purposes of applying the proposed fifty-percent
test could ameliorate the risk.
B. The Intermediary Objection
It might be suggested that the preceding proposal is meaningless
because the use of multiple layers of intermediaries will make it
impossible to know who owns shares in many cases. 84 We have two
responses to this objection. First, our proposal does not require
knowledge of the separate identities of shareowners. Instead, it
requires knowledge of an aggregate—i.e., whether U.S. residents,
who need not be specifically identified, own fifty percent or more of

83. A recent study found that foreign residents owned $5,543 trillion (24.3%) of the
$22,812 trillion U.S. C corporation stock outstanding at the end of 2015. See Rosenthal &
Austin, supra note 67, at 927. However, by using a definition of U.S. corporate equity that was
broader than C corporation stock, the Joint Committee Staff calculated that foreign investors
held only 17.4% of U.S. corporate equities at the close of 2015. See JOINT COMM.,
INTEGRATION, supra note 33, at 15. For a description of uncertainties in the data, see Chris
William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality,
68 TAX L. REV. 207 (2015).
84. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 22, at 140 (noting that assessing the “true” residence
of a corporation is seemingly impractical with regard to multi-tiered multinationals).
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the vote or value of a corporation’s shares. If there is sufficient
information to allow a determination that this aggregate benchmark
is satisfied with respect to a particular corporation, then that
corporation is a U.S. tax resident even if complex tiers of shareholding
obscure ownership of the remainder of its stock. This should reduce
the size of the problem presented by layers of intermediary owners.
Our second, and perhaps more important, response to the
intermediary ownership objection is that we now live in a postFATCA 85 world. It is not a large step from that world to one in which
publicly traded corporations are required to know the extent to which
their shares are beneficially owned by U.S. residents. FATCA itself
generally provides that corporations, whether U.S. or foreign, that pay
U.S.-source dividends to foreign financial institutions must confirm
that the foreign financial institution has complied with due diligence
requirements to identify the U.S. beneficial owners of accounts and
certain investment entities holding the shares or withhold a thirtypercent tax and remit it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).86
In addition, the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive of the
European Union (EU) requires that each EU member state direct its
domestic corporations to maintain accurate, current information
regarding beneficial ownership of their shares and to make it available
to governmental authorities. 87 Moreover, Norway has adopted
legislation establishing a public registry of corporate ownership
information. 88 We submit that the United States is operating in a world
where a snapshot of aggregate U.S. share ownership, even when layers
of intermediaries and frequent trading are involved, is, or soon can
be, knowable. 89
85. FATCA refers to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147,
§§ 501, 511, 124 Stat. 71, 109–110 (2010). The salient provisions of FATCA are in I.R.C. §§
1471–1474, 6038D (2012). For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see KUNTZ & PERONI,
supra note 24, at ¶¶ B1.08[6][A], C2.10.
86. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 276–77.
87. See Roman Seer, The European AEOI: Risks and Opportunities of Anti-Money
Laundering Acts, in 13 NEW EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION VERSUS TAX SOLUTIONS OF
EQUIVALENT EFFECT 57, 73 (Giuseppe Marino ed., EATLP Int’l Tax Series 2015).
88. See Sophie Haggerty, Norway Latest Country to Adopt Public Registry of Beneficial
Ownership, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY (June 15, 2015), http://www.gfintegrity.org/norwaylatest-country-to-adopt-public-registry-of-beneficial -ownership/.
89. Professor Chris Sanchirico has argued that neither Treasury data nor federal securities
law disclosures presently allow the U.S. ownership of large multinational corporations to be
determined. See Sanchirico, supra note 83. His analysis, however, does not take into account the
FATCA and EU developments described in the text at supra notes 85–89.
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This proposition raises an interesting question. If we are moving
to a world where it is possible to know whether a foreign-incorporated
entity is fifty percent or more owned by U.S. residents, can we then
determine the precise percentage of U.S. resident ownership and limit
U.S. taxation of a foreign-incorporated entity’s foreign income to that
percentage? Our response is that it is much easier to determine that a
foreign-incorporated entity is at least fifty percent owned by U.S.
residents than it is to determine the precise percentage of U.S.
ownership. Consequently, we are not presently prepared to
recommend that the percentage of a foreign-incorporated entity’s
foreign income that is subject to U.S. taxation should be defined by
the percentage of the entity’s equity that is owned by U.S. residents.
As tax enforcement progresses, however, this step may
become feasible. 90
C. The Related Party Objection
As for the problem of determining beneficial ownership when
stock is held by related parties, the United States has shown those
difficulties can be dealt with through indirect and constructive stock
ownership rules. Crafting the details of these rules is a task for another
article. Here we limit ourselves to observing that the existing rules in
Section 958 have proven workable and generally effective in the
international context. 91
We recognize that derivatives that draw their value from shares
of a particular corporation’s stock 92 can potentially be used to
circumvent indirect and constructive stock ownership provisions. The
development of rules to deal with derivatives is, however, a large
undertaking 93 that is outside the scope of this Article. Consequently,
90. We thank both Professor David Elkins and Ricardo Augusto Gil Reis Rodrigues of
the Doctor of International Business Taxation Program at the Vienna University of Economics
and Business for calling this point to our attention.
91. See I.R.C. § 958 (2012). For a comprehensive discussion of these rules, see KUNTZ
& PERONI, supra 24, at ¶ B3.
92. For a description of such derivatives, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX56-11, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
AND PRODUCTS 1–2 (2011).
93. See generally id. (providing a lengthy study of the issues presented by derivatives). U.S.
courts have experience examining the substance of derivative contracts to determine ownership
for tax purposes. For a recent court decision involving a failed attempt by the taxpayer to use
derivatives to obtain an inappropriate tax result, see Anschutz v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 78
(2010), aff’d, 664 F.3d 313 (10th Cir. 2011) (Tax Court rejecting attempted use of derivatives
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we do not address issues raised by derivatives except to say that
derivatives conferring the essential economic benefits of stock
ownership on U.S. resident derivative holders would be treated as
stock owned by U.S. residents for purposes of our proposal.
D. A Public Trading-Based Presumption
Taxpayers have fertile imaginations when it comes to creating
arrangements that are difficult for the IRS to analyze and understand.
Thus, our proposed shareholder-based residency test may turn out to
be difficult for the IRS to administer. An effective response would be
to recognize that if a corporation’s shares are traded in U.S. securities
markets, those shares are most likely marketed to and primarily held
by U.S. residents. 94 Consequently, we suggest that our proposed
shareholder-based residency definition be strengthened by a
rebuttable presumption that a foreign corporation is a U.S. tax
resident if any class of its shares is regularly traded in one or more U.S.
public capital markets or is marketed to U.S. persons. 95
This approach may seem problematic because it might create a bias
against listing companies in the United States. 96 In the worst case
scenario, as the argument goes, former U.S. corporations and historic
foreign corporations might de-list their shares in the United States and
list them on foreign stock exchanges, such as in London, Frankfurt,
and Paris. 97 However, since substantial share ownership of a
corporation by U.S. residents would alone be sufficient to make the
corporation a U.S. tax resident under our proposal, a corporation that
seeks U.S. investors would usually wind up in U.S. resident status,
even if it listed its shares outside the United States. Thus, a corporation
typically would lose little by a U.S. listing and a corporate residency
test based on trading in U.S. capital markets should not be a significant
barrier to U.S. listings. With respect to this proposed presumption, it

to monetize shares while avoiding ten-year Section 1374 built-in gains tax by postponing formal
transfer of shares).
94. Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1663.
95. See id. at 1663–64. Shares would be presumed to be marketed to U.S. persons if
disclosure documents discussed the consequences of classification of the foreign corporation as
a controlled foreign corporation or a PFIC.
96. See Am. Bar Ass’n Tax Sec. Task Force on Int’l Reform, Report of the Task Force on
International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 753 (Spring 2006) [hereinafter ABA Tax Section
Task Force Report]; Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1647.
97. See ABA Tax Section Report, supra note 96, at 753.
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is useful to note that for purposes of determining whether transferors
of U.S. corporate stock to a foreign corporation are U.S. persons, the
Section 367 regulations adopt a presumption that persons transferring
stock of a domestic corporation are U.S. persons. 98 The presumption
is rebutted if the contrary is shown through ownership statements
from transferors. 99
Finally, we should note that we view this proposed presumption as
a transition rule of sorts that eventually will be deleted from the
classification structure that we hope will be enacted into law. In our
view, once shareholder beneficial ownership information is required to
be available and foreign corporations are in a position to more readily
determine the identity of their shareholders, this public trading
presumption will no longer be necessary and could be eliminated.
E. Alternate Tests
For the reasons discussed above, we propose that the United
States adopt a shareholder-based definition of corporate residence that
is structured as follows:
A foreign corporation is a U.S. tax resident for any year if fifty
percent or more of its shares, determined by vote or value, was
beneficially owned by U.S. residents on the last day of the immediately
preceding year (or was the average ownership for the year by U.S.
residents as determined by averaging U.S. resident ownership on the
last day of each quarter of the preceding year). A foreign corporation
presumptively satisfies this threshold if any class of its shares is
regularly traded in one or more U.S. public capital markets or
marketed to U.S. persons.
A foreign corporation can rebut this presumption by showing that
U.S. resident beneficial ownership of its shares is below the fiftypercent threshold. The IRS can overcome the presumption in the
same way if it encounters cases where a corporation that is actually
foreign-owned lists a class of shares on a U.S. exchange in order to
achieve U.S. resident status for tax-avoidance reasons.
The proposed shareholder-ownership test would, however, be an
alternate definition. A corporation would continue to be a U.S. tax

98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c)(2) (2015).
99. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c)(7) (2015).
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resident if it were formed under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction. 100 This
approach has a convenience justification because it will eliminate the
need to inquire into stock ownership in many cases. But, that raises
the question of whether it is hypocritical for us to propose
continuation of the U.S. place-of-incorporation definition of
corporate residence after having gone to such lengths to argue that a
shareholder-based definition is the proper approach in principle.
We believe that continued use of the place-of-incorporation
approach is appropriate because that definition is a decent proxy for
U.S. share ownership. This is because the shares of U.S. corporations
are, on average, predominantly owned by U.S. residents. 101 This fact
is not surprising in light of the well-recognized “home bias” in
portfolio investments, which is demonstrated by the fact that investors
hold a larger share of local equities in their portfolios than would be
predicted by theories regarding the benefits of international
investment diversification. 102 Thus, the place-of-incorporation
definition of corporate residence is an acceptable rough justice rule,103
even though a theoretically pure definition would be based exclusively
on stock ownership.
If one were seriously concerned about outliers that fall beyond the
reasonable scope of average cases, one could make the place-ofincorporation definition rebuttable by U.S. corporations that
demonstrate U.S. resident beneficial ownership of their shares is below
the fifty-percent benchmark. If such an approach were taken, the IRS
should also be able to overcome this presumption on the same basis

100. A corporation, however, should not be characterized as a nonresident solely because
it is formed under foreign law. Doing so would create the problematic result of corporations
escaping U.S. resident status by means of foreign incorporation even when owned by
U.S. residents.
101. See generally JOINT COMM., INTEGRATION, supra note 33, at 15 (discussing the share
of U.S. corporations owned by foreign investors); Rosenthal & Austin, supra note 67, at 927
(analyzing the various different holders of stock in taxable accounts); Sanchirico, supra note 83
(discussing uncertainties in stock ownership data).
102. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-15, PRESENT LAW AND SELECTED
POLICY ISSUES IN THE U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME 35–36 (2015); Roger H.
Gordon & James R. Hines, Jr., International Taxation 37 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/WP2002-2paper.pdf; see also Lars Hornuf & Matthias Schmitt, Does
a Local Bias Exist in Equity Crowdfunding? The Impact of Investor Types and Portal Design 23–
24 (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Research Paper No. 16-07, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2801170 (finding a general local bias within Germany with respect
to equity crowdfunding investments).
103. See Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1652; see also Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note
60, at 159–60.
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in order to deal with cases where a foreign-owned corporation is
formed under U.S. law for tax-avoidance reasons. On balance,
however, we reject this exception to the place-of-incorporation
definition on grounds of administrative complexity. The possibility to
rebut U.S. residence in the event of more-than-fifty-percent foreign
ownership would, among other effects, (i) require each corporate
taxpayer to consider the option; (ii) require appropriately
strengthened tax rules for the transition from a domestic to a foreign
corporation; and (iii) potentially provide a windfall gain to
shareholders in predominantly foreign-owned U.S. corporations who
acquired their shares at prices reflecting the burden of U.S. tax
residence. Moreover, U.S. incorporation does not happen unless it is
affirmatively chosen. Thus, in our view, there are relatively few outliers
who would be harmed by the place-of-incorporation definition.
F. Other Proxies
In Section III.E of this Article, 104 we advocated using U.S.
incorporation as an alternate U.S. residency test because U.S.
incorporation seems to be an effective proxy for substantial U.S. share
ownership. In this Section, we examine additional possible proxies.
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has recommended
that a publicly traded foreign-incorporated entity be treated as a U.S.
tax resident if its headquarters are located in the United States. 105 In a
similar vein, Professor George Yin has proposed treating a foreign
corporation as a U.S. tax resident if its principal customer base is in
the United States. 106 Finally, Professor Adam Rosenzweig has
proposed completely eliminating the present place-of-incorporation
test and characterizing both U.S.-incorporated and foreignincorporated entities as U.S. tax residents if (1) fifty percent or more
of the gross income of a corporation for a year is U.S.-source, or (2)
at least half of the average percentage of assets held by the corporation
during the year produces U.S.-source income or is held for production
of U.S.-source income. 107

104. See supra text accompanying notes 100–102.
105. See JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE, supra note 11, at 179–80; Marian,
Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1643–47.
106. See George K. Yin, Letter to the Editor, Stopping Corporate Inversions Sensibly and
Legally, 144 TAX NOTES 1087, 1087–88 (2014).
107. Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 507.
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In this Article, we have argued that U.S. corporate tax residency
should be linked to the residence of the owners of a significant block
of the corporation’s shares. It seems to us that because of the stock
ownership data and home country bias referred to in Section III.E,108
a corporation that satisfies any of the three immediately preceding
residency definitions likely would have a substantial block of its shares
in the hands of U.S. residents. Thus, these tests would be substantially
consistent with our shareholder-residence approach. Nevertheless, it
would be appropriate to allow foreign corporations to escape the
preceding tests by proving that ownership of their shares by U.S.
residents does not actually satisfy the fifty-percent benchmark
described in Section III.A.
More importantly, even in the corporate inversion context, each
of the three preceding tests is likely to have undesirable behavioral
effects. The headquarters test will obviously deter corporations from
maintaining their headquarters in the United States. Indeed, there is
an adequate number of tax-advantaged foreign locations where U.S.
managers can be stationed without their having to learn another
language or sacrifice lifestyle comforts (e.g., Dublin, London,
or Singapore). 109
Likewise, Professor Yin’s customer base test would have an adverse
behavioral element. It would encourage corporations to limit the sales
they make to U.S. buyers. We recognize that the attractiveness of the
U.S. market would overcome this effect in most cases, but given the
fact that our shareholder residence-based test would be an effective
tool against manipulation of corporate residency, we see no reason to
incur the behavioral risk inherent in Professor Yin’s test, even if the
risk is small. We have a similar reservation with respect to Professor
Rosenzweig’s proposed test because it would encourage corporations
to limit their U.S.-source income and their U.S.-based
production assets.
An alternative approach would be to treat a foreign-incorporated
entity for tax purposes in the same manner as an individual and
analogize the determination of corporate residence to the
determination of whether a foreign individual is a resident of the
United States. Although we reject this approach, it is worth the

108. See supra text accompanying notes 101–103.
109. See generally Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of
Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 188–89 (2008). But see
Marian, Jursidiction, supra note 30, at 1645–46 (arguing the contrary).
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following brief exploration. Foreign individuals are classified as
residents for U.S. federal income tax purposes if they are accorded
permanent resident (i.e., green card) status for immigration purposes
or if they maintain a substantial presence in the United States (which
generally is measured by days of physical presence in the
United States). 110
To maintain this analogy with an individual, a foreignincorporated entity could be considered a U.S. tax resident if it
maintained a substantial presence in the United States. 111 One way to
measure substantial presence would be if more than fifty percent of its
operating assets were located in the United States for more than 183
days in a year. 112 This substantial presence approach would provide a
fully adequate basis for the United States to assert jurisdiction to tax a
foreign corporation’s worldwide income. 113 Although this approach is
similar to the assets prong of Professor Rosenzweig’s proposal, it
would not use the income prong. We do not agree with looking to
the amount of U.S.-source income as a residence test because, as
recognized by Professor Rosenzweig, it closely aligns with a formula
apportionment-like exemption of foreign income. We do not view this
as a positive feature for a corporation predominantly owned by U.S.
persons, because it defeats the underlying ability-to-pay objective of
an income-based tax system.

110. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012).
111. This analogy of an entity to an individual is incomplete, for among other reasons,
because it does not take into account the incidence of the corporate income tax.
112. The same-country dividends and interest exception to the definition of Subpart F
foreign personal holding company income includes a requirement that the controlled foreign
corporation have “a substantial part of its assets used in its trade or business located in such . . .
country.” I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A)(i) (2012). The regulations apply a 50 percent substantial assets
test for this purpose and provide rules for identifying the location of tangible and intangible
assets. Treas. Reg. § 4.954-2(b)(3)(iv)–(xi) (2016) (providing rules for valuing and determining
the location of tangible and intangible assets of a controlled foreign corporation). For a detailed
discussion of the same-country dividends and interest exception, see KUNTZ & PERONI, supra
note 24, at ¶ B3.05[2][k1].
113. If this suggestion were adopted, it would be possible to employ the PFIC 25 percent
stock ownership look-through rule to test the assets of a foreign holding company. But what if
there was a non-U.S. parent holding company with both a U.S. subsidiary and a non-U.S.
subsidiary, and the U.S. subsidiary held just over 50 percent of the group’s total assets? Could
the United States rely on jurisdiction over the U.S. subsidiary to assert jurisdiction to tax the
worldwide income of the rest of the group? Based on existing law, the answer is affirmative and
it likely is possible to obtain the relevant information. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6038A (2012). However,
collection may have to rely on jurisdiction over the U.S. assets.
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More broadly, we do agree with Professors Rosenzweig and Yin
that it is possible, and in the right case appropriate, to de-emphasize
theory and adopt an instrumental, anti-tax avoidance approach to
defining corporate residence. Nevertheless, an entity-level test that is
not based on shareholder residence and that is not effectively elective
will always be over- and under-inclusive in relation to our preferred
shareholder residence criterion. It will be over-inclusive to the extent
that it taxes foreign income of a predominantly foreign-owned
corporation. It will be under-inclusive to the extent it fails to tax
foreign income of a corporation predominantly owned by U.S.
persons. 114 In addition, entity-level classification based on U.S.
location of assets and activities is substantially equivalent to adopting
a de facto formulary exemption system. We have explained our
objections to such a system in earlier work. 115
In the end, we conclude that our shareholder-based residence test,
supplemented with the existing place-of-incorporation test, provides
the best approach.
G. The Dual Residence Problem
Our proposed use of multiple corporate residence definitions
would, of course, increase the number of corporations that are treated
as dual residents with respect to the U.S. international income taxation
system. However, several other countries with large economies
employ multiple corporate residency tests without encountering
unmanageable difficulties. 116 The same would likely be true with
respect to the United States. Thus, we do not see this concern as a
significant barrier to adopting our multi-part approach to defining
corporate residence.
IV. CONCLUSION
With respect to taxable shareholders, an unintegrated tax on
corporate earnings, set at a relatively high rate, is best justified as a
crude tax on those shareholders that prevents them from gaming the
differences between individual and corporate tax rates and blocks
114. Professor Rosenzweig points out other over- and under-inclusive features of his test
as well. Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 479. In the text following supra note 109, we also have
noted behavorial problems regarding Professor Rosenzweig’s test.
115. See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Lipstick, supra note 21 (discussing the problems
with a formulary apportionment system).
116. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 434–36.
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corporations from being used as egregious tax deferral devices. With
respect to tax-exempt shareholders, the corporate tax carries out the
congressional policy of applying one level of tax to the corporate
equity investments of those shareholders. These points lead to the
further conclusion that the definition of corporate residence that is
employed in the U.S. income tax should be based on shareholder
residence because shareholders are the ultimate targets of the
corporate income tax.
We have argued that the best way to accomplish this end is to take
a multi-part approach that first defines a corporation as a U.S. resident
if it is incorporated in a U.S. jurisdiction. This is justifiable because the
data shows that, on average, such corporations are predominately
owned by U.S. residents. In addition, we have argued that a foreignincorporated entity should be treated as a U.S. resident if on a snapshot
date or dates, at least fifty percent of its shares, by vote or value, is
owned by U.S. residents. We have also argued for bolstering this
alternative definition of corporate residence with a rebuttable
presumption that foreign-incorporated entities are U.S. residents if at
least one class of their shares is regularly traded in one or more U.S.
capital markets or is marketed to U.S. persons. This presumption
derives from the insight that if a corporation markets its shares to U.S.
investors, the shares are likely to be primarily held by U.S. residents—
a conclusion that is supported by the well-recognized home bias of
investors. A foreign corporation could, however, rebut this
presumption by demonstrating that U.S. residents own less than fifty
percent of both the vote and value of its shares.
This multi-part approach to defining corporate residence would
remove the principal tax advantages of inversion transactions in which
a U.S. corporation merges into a smaller foreign corporation. This is
so because the surviving foreign corporation would be treated as a
U.S. tax resident under our proposal. More importantly, our approach
would bolster the case for real worldwide taxation by making
corporate tax residence a largely non-elective matter.
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